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The U.S. military, both our nation's largest consumer and se-
curer of energy, can no longer be absolved of the high costs and
environmental consequences of its reliance on conventional fuel sources
and energy systems in the face of mounting evidence of unavoidable
global warming and climate change. The oil-dependent U.S. national
and energy security policies that have helped achieved American mili-
tary and economic greatness are no longer sustainable; in fact,
uncovering the hidden costs of our oil addiction reveals many insecuri-
ties. In order to progress towards true energy independence, the U.S.
must overcome its congressional in-fighting, and kick-start its promis-
ing array of green technology and clean energy systems. Military-public
collaborations with the private sector have the potential to advance the
clean energy market at a low cost to all actors. They also promise to
improve military environmental policies, thereby introducing cross-sec-
tor, multi-beneficial green-technology into the civilian marketplace and
contributing to national education and outreach programs. Shedding
our oil addiction will assure that a new era of green warriors, fleets,
and convoys will survive, and perhaps, thrive in a future of climate
change, adaptation, and mitigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Our oil addiction . .. is our greatest threat to our national secur-
ity..... C02 emissions and climate change and the instability that
that all drives . . . increases the likelihood there will be conflicts in
which American soldiers are going to have to fight and die
somewhere.1
Oil and gas make front page news on a near-daily basis.2 Never-
theless, the efforts needed to secure access to these resources,
including the military's contribution to the maintenance of energy se-
curity, have, until relatively recently, been obliquely hidden, ignored,
or unaddressed. With the effects of climate change already being felt
physically, economically, and politically, it is increasingly difficult to
pretend as though the enormous consumption of energy by the Depart-
ment of Defense, its greenhouse gas emissions, and energy security
issues need not be taken into general, public account.
The cost of reliance on fossil fuels is enormous; in this finan-
cially constricted climate, such expenditures have been straining the
U.S. military and budget. Freedom may not be free, as it were, but it
should not cost more than absolutely necessary, either in terms of dol-
lars or lives. Continued reliance on oil-based energy models, however,
is unacceptably unaffordable under either currency, particularly in the
face of global warming. The Department of Defense, in collaboration
with the private sector, has been making headway in renewable energy
systems, producing advanced waste-to-energy projects and a suite of
vehicles running on alternative fuels that will stop at schools and com-
munity facilities to demonstrate its hybrid systems and battery
technologies. Yet, in order to truly revamp our domestic energy policy,
1. Jill Fitzsimmons, 15 Military Leaders Who Say Climate Change Is A National
Security Threat, MEDIA MATrERS FOR AM. BLOG (May 30, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://
mediamatters.org/blog/2012/05/30/15-military-leaders-who-say-climate-change-is-a/184705
(quoting Brig. General Steven Anderson, USA (Ret.), former Chief of Logistics under
General Petraeus).
2. See Clifford Krauss & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/globall
16iht-bpl6.html?pagewanted=all (BP to pay $4.5 billion in criminal fines and face 14 counts
of criminal acts related to the April 2010 oil spill); Winnie Hu, New York City Will Keep Gas
Rationing Until Week's End, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11I/
19/nyregion/new-york-to-extend-gas-rationing-through-friday.html? r=O (New York City to
maintain oddleven days for post-Hurricane Sandy gas rationing); Mary Esch, NY Agency
Names Panel to Review Fracking Study, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK NEWS (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-11-16/ny-agency-names-panel-to-review-fracking-
study (The New York health department names expert panel to review the state's
environmental study on hydraulic fracturing).
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the U.S. government must take a hard look at hidden costs in the ef-
forts to secure energy both here and abroad.
This Article traces the origins and potential for the future of
American energy security by questioning whether the United States
has truly committed to a policy of energy independence. It further con-
tends that the cross-sector benefits of public-private green technology
and clean renewable energy promise to overcome lack of funding, in-
centivize investors and innovators alike, and transform a nascent
energy market.
Part I of this Article provides a brief historical overview of the
salient points of U.S. energy and foreign policy from 1983 to the pre-
sent. This background is important to examine the extent and
implications of the Department of Defense's energy consumption and
where the Department falls in the national spectrum of supporters and
detractors of sustainability risks and opportunities.
Part II delves into the economics of energy security, investigat-
ing the hidden costs of securing, transporting, and consuming oil. As
existing oil reserves are tapped, reliance on petroleum increasingly
reveals the dangers inherent in energy insecurity. This section exam-
ines several perspectives to define a concept of energy security that
addresses foreign policy considerations, operational security, and do-
mestic energy security concerns.
Part III asks whether the United States is truly progressing to-
wards energy independence, particularly when Congress remains
largely opposed to many green-tech and biofuel military initiatives.
However, this resistance has not stopped the Department of Defense
from forging ahead to address power generation and energy efficiency
at U.S. bases, transform military modes of transportation, and in-
crease soldier power. In fact, many of the Department of Defense's
success stories are the products of green military initiatives that both
encourage and request cross-sector cooperation.
Part IV concludes by encouraging the continued collaboration
between military and public-private actors for the domestic and global
benefit of the green energy marketplace and endorsing the Department
of Defense and the Department of Energy as leaders in this energy
market transformative process.
I. BACKGROUND
The Obama Administration has established a framework of
statutes and policies that now guide the Department of Energy (DOE)
and constrain the Department of Defense (DOD), squarely confronting
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the true fuel cost burden on the battlefield as well as on U.S. soil. The
concept of energy security has only recently broadened to include com-
plex vulnerability issues. For decades, it was narrowly equated with
U.S. dependence on oil imports and the attendant, sometimes volatile,
international relationships thereby created.3
A. Policy Administration
The defining moment of U.S. energy security policy may have
been the birth of the Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980.4 President
Jimmy Carter declared Persian Gulf oil a "vital interest" that the
United States would use "any means necessary, including military
force" to protect.5 Central Command (CENTCOM) was established a
few years later on January 1, 1983 and tasked with upholding the Doc-
trine in the Middle East region.6 In 1987, President Reagan ordered
warships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers crossing the Persian Gulf to pro-
tect them from attack by Iran and Iraq.7 In August 1990, President
George H. W. Bush, mindful of Saudi oil resources, deployed
CENTCOM forces to Saudi Arabia to deter a possible Iraqi attack as
part of the Persian Gulf War.8
In 2001, early in the presidency of George W. Bush, the Defense
Science Board conducted a study of the true cost burden of fuel on the
battlefield and reported two remarkable findings.9 First, although the
DOD annually established a "standard fuel price," it did not reflect the
cost to the Services of delivering the fuel to its ultimate consumer. 10
Second, fuel efficiency was not a major factor in the requirements and
acquisitions processes." The Second Gulf War1 2 exploded in 2003. The
3. DOUGLAs R. BOHI & MICHAEL A. ToMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY SECURITY 3
(1996).
4. MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL: THE DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA'S GROWING PETROLEUM DEPENDENCY 3 (2004).
5. Id. at 4 (quoting President Jimmy Carter).
6. Id. at 2, 4. Since then, Centcom forces have fought in four major engagements: the
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Afghanistan War of 2001, and
the Iraq War of 2003. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 5.
9. JOHN W. LYONS, RICHARD CHAIT & JAMES J. VALDES, CTR. FOR TECH. & NAT'L SEC.
POLICY, Assessing the Army Power and Energy Efforts for the Warfighter 12 (Nat'1 Defense
Univ. Mar. 2011), available at http://www.ndu.edulCTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2081%20
Assessing%20Army%20Power%20and%20Energy.pdf.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id.
12. Also referred to as the Iraq War, the War in Iraq, the Occupation of Iraq, or
Operation Iraqi Freedom by the U.S. military.
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first military objective was to secure control over the oil fields and re-
fineries of southern Iraq.13 Following the incursion into Baghdad, U.S.
forces seized and occupied the Oil Ministry, ignoring the looters attack-
ing the other government buildings in the area. 14 The cumulative
history of U.S. intervention in this area to this point suggests that "the
American military is being used more and more for the protection of
overseas oil fields and the supply routes that connect them to the
United States and its allies."1 5 The Carter Doctrine required the pro-
tection of oil fields, refineries, and supply routes at virtually any cost,
the calculation of which patently ignored fuel efficiency and the sub-
stantial burdens of security and delivery.
A few years later, however, the Bush administration seemed to
embrace a new perspective on its energy policies, introducing the pro-
vision of tax incentives and loan guarantees for various kinds of energy
production. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) Section 203
mandates the minimum contribution of renewable energy to a federal
installation's total electricity consumption. 16 In 2006, the Bush admin-
istration called for the diversification of energy supplies across regions
and across types of energy in its National Security Strategy.17
Nevertheless, the Defense Science Board, once again early in
the term of new president Barack Obama, released a significant report
concluding that the "Department of Defense is the largest single con-
sumer of energy in the United States."18 A series of energy-related
statutes and policies were quickly enacted over the course of the Presi-
dent's first term. The John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) of 2007 codified the DOD's voluntary goal of producing 25
13. KLARE, supra note 4, at 7.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 109 P.L. 58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15852)
(targets of 3% FY 2007 through FY 2009; 5% through FY 2012, and not less than 7.5 %
beginning FY 2013).
17. Anita Dancs, Mary Orisich & Suzanne Smith, The Military Cost of Securing Energy
16 (Nat'l Priorities Project Oct. 2008), available at http://humansecuritygateway.com/
documents/NPP MilitaryCostOfSecuringEnergy.pdf.
18. LYONS, CHArr & VALDES, supra note 9 at 12. In 2006, the DOD "spent $13.6 billion
to buy 110 million barrels of petroleum fuel (about 300,000 barrels of oil each day), and 3.8
billion kWh of electricity. This represents about 0.8% of total U.S. energy consumption and
78% of energy consumption by the Federal government. Buildings and facilities account for
about 25% of the Department's total energy use. DOD occupies over 577,000 buildings and
structures worth $712 billion comprising more than 5,300 sites. In 2006, the Department
spent over $3.5 billion for energy to power fixed installations, and just over $10 billion on
fuel for combat and combat related systems." Id.
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percent of all its energy from renewable sources by 2025.19 The Janu-
ary 2007 Executive Order (EO) 13423, entitled Strengthening Federal
Environmental, Energy, and Transportation, reiterates the EPAct
2005 goals, using a different basis for measuring and crediting pro-
gress. 2 0 The Energy and Security Independence Act of 2007 (EISA)
was passed
to move the United States towards greater energy independence
and security, to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to
protect consumers, to increase the efficiency of products, buildings,
and vehicles, to promote research on and deploy greenhouse gas
capture and storage options, and to improve the energy perform-
ance of the Federal Government, and for other purposes. 21
On October 5, 2009, President Obama issued EO 13514 with the
stated goal of making the federal government a leader in sustainable
building practices by directing agencies to use more clean energy and
cut greenhouse gases (GHGs) by establishing goals for the federal gov-
ernment's building practices and performance and by requiring
agencies to set 2020 GHG emissions reduction targets. 2 2
The DOE is the agency responsible for developing guidance for
EPAct 2005 and the EOs. Its guidelines for EO compliance allow credit
for renewable energy that reduces electricity use from thermal sources
but adds a requirement that at least 50 percent of renewable energy
must come from "new" resources, or those put into service after Janu-
ary 1, 1999.23 Because the DOE is not responsible for establishing
DOD policies to achieve NDAA goals, its guidelines for EPAct 2005 in-
dicate that renewable energy like solar thermal energy, daylighting, or
ground source heat pumps cannot be credited towards EPAct 2005
goals since Congress did not provide a definition of "renewable" in the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 language. 2 4
19. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 2852(e)(1), 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) (codified as amended in various sections of 10
U.S.C.).
20. Exec. Order No. 13423, 48 C.F.R. § 970.223-6 (Jan. 24, 2007).
21. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Preamble, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (2007).
22. LEED Sustainable Building Practices Go Global, 36 CONsTR. CONTRACTS L. REP.
101 (June 22, 2012) (Agencies were further directed to increase energy efficiency; reduce
fleet petroleum consumption; conserve water; reduce waste; support sustainable
communities; and leverage federal purchasing power to promote environmentally
responsible products and technologies).
23. Guidance and Interpretation of Goals, Renewable Energy, ARMY ENERGY PROGRAM,




On March 30, 2011, President Obama challenged the Depart-
ments of Navy, Energy, and Agriculture to become green leaders in the
Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future.25 The three agencies will part-
ner with private industry to accelerate the commercialization of drop-
in biofuels for military and commercial use and constructing or re-
trofitting multiple integrated biorefineries. 26 The marked federal
ramping up of energy conservation, efficiency, and renewable policies
will force the DOD to carefully scrutinize its practices and technology
to meet new goals.
B. The DOD: Energy Use 2 7
Pike Research recently released a report stating that the vari-
ous branches of the DOD combined make the single largest consumer of
energy in the world, surpassing the consumption totals of more than
100 nations.2 8 Of the military energy budget, 25 percent is for facilities
and infrastructure and 75 percent is for fuel, at about 120 million bar-
rels of oil per year.29 The DOD's annual petroleum use fuels inefficient
weapons platforms, and most of the fuel used by the military is ex-
hausted moving that very fuel around.3 0 For instance, when the Army
deploys, 70 percent of the gross tonnage moved is simply fuel.3 1
Pike Research predicts that the DOD will steadily ramp up
spending on renewable energy programs, including conservation mea-
sures, over the next 12 years to reach almost $1.8 billion in 2025.32
Pew Charitable Trust recently released a report that acknowledged the
military's already marked push for green energy. Over the last four
years, the military tripled its investment in technologies like biofuels,
solar panels, and electric vehicles, with the DOD spending $1.2 billion
25. The White House, Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future (2011), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint-secure-energy-future.pdf.
26. Id. at, inter alia, 23, 25.
27. For a broader perspective on DOD/DOE energy initiatives and programs, see
Joseph P. Tomain, "Our Generation's Sputnik Moment". Regulating Energy Innovation, 31
UTAH ENVrL. L. REV. 389, 417-426 (2011).
28. Cheryl Kaften, US Military to Spend $1.8 Billion on Clean Energy by 2025, With




30. Armory Lovins, Battling Fuel Waste in the Military, RMISOLUTIONs J., Fall 2001,
at 1, available for download at http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/SO1-12
BattlingMilitaryFuelWaste.
31. Id.
32. Kaften, supra note 28.
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a year on alternative energy.3 3 In June 2011, the DOD released a
strategy outlining the need for energy conservation in military opera-
tions, calling for a DOE Board to oversee the department's progress
and work with the services and agencies on ways to improve their con-
sumption baselines.34 However, what has served as the impetus for
this radical overhaul in both DOD and DOE energy policy has been the
accounting of the true cost of traditional fossil fuel security, distribu-
tion, and consumption.
II. ENERGY SECURITY
A. Externalities: Burdening Costs, Unburdening Backpacks
Until relatively recently, the extraction, refining, distribution,
and consumption of energy have been externalities in the debate over
oil and security.35 Whether and how to include them in cost calcula-
tions has been the subject of further debate. In 1996, Douglas R. Bohi
and Michael A. Toman contended that such an analysis was essentially
too difficult because no one was bothering to study the relevant issues:
a defensible estimate of the externality associated with U.S. mili-
tary spending for oil import security would require an in-depth
analysis of what rationales exist for military spending, how the
level of spending has been affected by changes in the volume of oil
imports, and how the reduction in oil imports would improve eco-
nomic welfare. No study of these issues has been undertaken.
Until an effort that yields a credible measure of the externality in-
volved is complete, this externality is too uncertain to be used in
determining energy policy. 36
They further emphasized that such military expenditures have
been a cost of mitigating energy security, rather than a cost of insecu-
rity itself and that other national security interests are being served
since a U.S. military presence also benefits other nations.37 However,
much has changed in the 16 years since Bohi and Toman published
33. Amy Standen, U.S. Military Boosts Clean Energy, With Startup Help, NPR (Oct.
24, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141548273/the-military-boosts-clean-energy-with-
startup-help?sc=emaf.
34. Operational Energy Strategy Implementation Plan, DEP'T. OF DEF. (Mar. 2012),
available at http://energy.defense.gov/OperationalEnergyStrategy-ImplementationPlan.
pdf.
35. Dancs, Orisich & Smith, supra note 17 at 5 ("An externality is when the
consumption or production of a good leads to additional costs (or benefits) for a third party.")
36. BOHI & ToMAN, supra note 3, at 54.
37. Id. at 122.
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their findings, especially considering the significant fuel costs entailed
in U.S. engagement in two simultaneous Middle East conflicts.
These fuel delivery costs are measurably considerable and, if
factored into a market valuation of gasoline, could affect a sea change
in the energy market, particularly in renewables. When the military
deploys to the Middle East region, an armored division may use as
much as 600,000 gallons of fuel, with each tank trailed by clunky fuel
tankers.38 The Army, for instance, directly uses about $0.2 billion
worth of fuel a year but pays about $3.2 billion a year to maintain the
20,000 active and 40,000 reserve personnel to move that fuel.3 9 Fac-
tors such as deployability, agility, range, speed, reliability, and
maneuverability of these fuel-related services, items, and humans, are
"invisible" as the fuel delivery cost, 4 0 such that, despite the rise or fall
in gas prices, what Americans pay at the pump does not reflect the true
costs of filling up their cars or trucks.4 1 The costs the U.S. military
pays in committing resources to transport and to secure access to oil
and other energy supplies, fail to show up in the market valuation of
gasoline, heating fuel, or other uses; rather, they are paid for by Ameri-
can tax dollars. 42 Like Anita Dancs, Mary Orisich, and Suzanne
Smith, many argue that if the market value reflected the true cost,
consumer demand would decrease, conservation would increase, and
the renewable, non-polluting energy alternatives would encourage a vi-
able market.43 In short, the inclusion of the extraction, refining,
distribution and consumption in the calculation of the true market
price of energy supplies would necessitate a shift away from the status
quo. 44
Difficulties in adequately identifying costs and the amount of
resources devoted to securing energy persist. Nonetheless, Dancs,
Orisich, and Smith, among others, have set forth two methods of calcu-
lating the fully burdened costs of securing access to fuel just before and
during the Iraq War using then-current budgetary and other DOD
information:
38. Lovins, supra note 30, at 7.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
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Peacetime With Iraq War
Method 1 $97.0 billion $103.5 billion
Method 2 $208.9 billion $215.4 billion 4 5
The two methodologies incorporate different assumptions.
Method 1 was developed using the force-construct planning of the Two
Major-Theater War strategy utilized by the DOD. 4 6 Method 2 involved
breaking down the military budget by region of the world, then esti-
mating the proportion of activities in each region related to securing
access to energy. 47 The estimates, though large, are conservative. 48
Nevertheless, the cost of energy, particularly during wartime, is
clearly enormous. In an increasingly financially and energy con-
strained economy, such expenditures put pressure on both the military
and the U.S. government to find new ways to reduce costs. In doing so,
they must take a hard look at hidden costs in the efforts to secure en-
ergy. Reducing costs promises more than merely easing economic
hardship, however; it can lessen impact on the environment by facili-
tating a transition away from fossil fuels and lead to greater energy
independence. 4 9
B. Energy Insecurity
In the broadest sense, energy security relates to the degree of
economic welfare attached to the rise or fall in either the price or avail-
ability of energy.50 The inevitable variability of energy availability
centers on oil's nonrenewable character. Somewhat paradoxically,
U.S. economic and military dominance has been fueled by seemingly
inexhaustible supplies of petroleum. As other economic and military
juggernauts such as China grow, the U.S. must consume more and
more oil to maintain its position, requiring the ever-increasing import
45. Dancs, Orisich & Smith, supra note 17 at 6, 9. For an analysis of military force
project in the Persian Gulf, see also Roger J. Stern, United States Cost of Military Force
Projection in the Persian Gulf, 1976-2007, 38 ENERGY POLICY 6, at 2816-25, available at
http:/www.princeton.eduloeme/articles/US-miiltary-cost-of-Persian-Gulf-force-projection.
pdf.
46. Id. at 6, 13-15. This strategy sizes the military force to fight two wars in two
different regions of the world. The military budget is further defined according to
contingencies, and to those contingencies relevant to securing access to energy are
attributed resources. Id.
47. Id. at 6, 32-35.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. at 6.
50. BoHI & TOMAN, supra note 3, at 1.
272
ENERGY SECURITY
of foreign petroleum as our own production dwindles.51 At some point,
even foreign supplies supply will run out. The source of American mili-
tary strength and power has now become its Achilles' heel. The Center
for Naval Analyses, a nonprofit, military-oriented think tank, engaged
a number of retired officers to inform their 2009 report that criticized
the overall U.S. energy posture as "a serious and urgent threat to na-
tional security-militarily, diplomatically and economically."5 2 Even
as the Pentagon increasingly relies on ever more sophisticated technol-
ogy to fight its wars, it still relies on fighting machines and soldiers
dependent on petroleum. 53 This deeply dependent relationship to oil-
in operational strategy, foreign policy, and domestic infrastructure-
and its tendency to paper over many hidden yet enormous energy costs
begs for an overhaul of U.S. energy strategy.
1. Energy Security
Though energy security can take on a number of connotations in
different contexts, they nonetheless all intersect and influence each
other. Deploying troops to the Middle East and elsewhere involves for-
eign policy considerations that impact a wide range of actors; it also
strongly affects operational security. What goes on in these foreign
realms, however, has significant influence on domestic national policy
and national security issues.
2. Foreign Policy Considerations
Energy security concerns determine where American troops put
their lives at risk to protect oil. As discussed in Part I, the United
States is often drawn into conflicts that center on or affect sources of
petroleum, recently and particularly in the Middle East. As these sup-
plies dwindle, the competition for these resources will increase and
likely cause even more tension and conflict, pulling in U.S. forces, if
they are not already there. However, the Persian Gulf War high-
lighted an aspect of this warfare that had not been previously taken
into account: environmental devastation. Sensing imminent invasion,
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein threatened to set fire to Kuwaiti oil
fields if attacked, which he promptly did after coalition air force strikes
51. KLARE, supra note 4, at 10.
52. Tom Gjelten, Military Officers Tie Energy to National Security, NPR (May 18,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=104267992&sc=emaf. The
report cited the nation's electrical grid as being particularly vulnerable. Id.
53. KLARE, supra note 4, at 9.
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began on January 16, 1991.54 The burning of the oil fields created one
of the largest oil spills in history, killing wildlife and destroying fisher-
ies in the Persian Gulf.5 5 Such environmental warfare tactics have
serious environmental law implications.
3. Operational Security: More fight for less fuel - less fuel,
fewer lives lost.
Operational security and energy security have become interre-
lated on the modern battlefield. Operational security involves the
functions and security of the forward operating bases and combat oper-
ations posts as well as the troops themselves. Generally, two major
energy related problems plague operations: the first is that access to
fuel can be difficult, particularly during the early expeditionary phase
of operations; the second is the cost and operational difficulties posed
by waste disposal.56
The idea of "more fight for less fuel"5 7 addresses access to fuel
and fully burdening the cost of fuel to arrive at more economic and
efficient solutions. The full burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) entails an
analysis of the nature of the fuel required, the phase of operations, and
the type of unit or facility using the fuel.58 A relatively straightfor-
ward example involves looking at an ordinary $15,000 tent used in the
deserts of Iraq or Afghanistan.5 9 To beat the 120 degree heat, the thin-
walled, uninsulated tents must be air-conditioned.60 With the air-con-
ditioners kept on at all times and cool air leaking out of the tents,
massive amounts of fuel must be trucked into camps.6 1 The true cost of
that $15,000 tent jumps to $40,000, accounting for the $25,000 worth
of air conditioning to cool the tent.62
The analysis of the fuel itself undergoes a similar hypervalua-
tion. For each dollar spent on fuel delivered to an Army terminal
54. STEPHEN Dycus, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 138-39 (1996).
55. Id.
56. LYONS, CHArT & VALDES, supra note 9, at 18.
57. Cheryl Kaften, US Military Sets its Sights on Solar to Sideline Fossil Fuels, PV
MAG. (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/us-military-sets-
its-sights-on-solar-to-sideline-fossil-fuels_100006426/#axzz2BPlZaxtY.
58. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9, at 10.
59. Radio Interview with Steve Anderson, Brigadier Gen. & Ray Mabus, Sec'y of the





62. KLARE, supra note 4, at 10.
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within the United States, ten dollars is spent on the battlefield to move
the fuel for personnel costs for active troops.63 Another six dollars are
spent for reserve personnel costs.6 4
The relationship between the amount of fuel and water trans-
ported and lives lost is striking.65 By some estimates, 70 percent of the
convoys traveling throughout the theater of war are involved in liquid
logistics, or the delivery of fuel and water.66 According to a 2009 bat-
tlefield energy audit conducted by the Marine Corps in Afghanistan,
seven times as many trucks carried water as fuel.6 7 In Afghanistan,
fuel reaches the front lines via tanks and planes crossing the ocean,
trucks coming from Tajikistan or Russia, and sometimes helicopters
flying in from forward locations. 68 Armored tanks are trailed by fuel
tanks; those that are unarmored are particularly vulnerable to attack,
and an attack on rear logistics can both bring the convoy to a grinding
halt, and deprive remote forward bases of much-needed fuel.69 Fuel
trucks incoming from nearby nations can travel for weeks on winding
mountain roads before reaching their destinations-weeks in which
those trucks are sitting ducks for terrorist attacks.70 By the time the
fuel reaches remote military bases, the FBCF can reach anywhere from
$30 to as high as $400 per gallon.71
These convoys are not only expensive, they literally cost lives.
A 2009 report by the Army Environmental Policy Institute gave the
casualty factor for fuel resupplies in Afghanistan as 0.042, or 0.042
casualties for every fuel-related resupply convoy. 72 That ratio means
63. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9, at 8.
64. Id.
65. See the following chart compiled from information from fiscal year 2007:
FY2007 Fuel transported in Ave. capacity of 16- # of fuel-up convoys
theater supply-truck convoy required a year
Iraq 502,110,368gal 97,818gal 5,133
Afghanistan 87,731,302gal or 2.1 97,818gal 897
million barrels
Gordon Feller, Casualty Costs of Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys in Afghanistan and
Iraq, ARMY-TECHNOLOGY.COM (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.army-technology.com/features/fea-
ture77200/#.UFiWu-7UWxo.email.
66. David Roberts, The Marines Go Renewable, OUTSIDE MAG. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://
www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/natural-intelligence/Natural-Intelligence-
Charge.html?page=all.
67. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9, at 19.
68. Roberts, supra note 66.
69. Lovins, supra note 30, at 2.
70. Radio Interview with Steve Anderson & Ray Mabus, supra note 59.
71. Roberts, supra note 66.
72. Id. See also Feller, supra note 65.
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one casualty for every 24 fuel resupply convoys 73-a significant num-
ber considering that over 3,000 resupply convoys were expected to have
been deployed in 2012.7 The report also calculates that "a 10% reduc-
tion in fuel consumption over a five-year period could lead to a
reduction of 35 fuel-related resupply casualties over the same pe-
riod."75 These numbers are not lost on the military. Army ground
troops and Marines have already reduced their energy consumption in
Afghanistan by using renewable energy sources and improving energy
efficiency: solar rechargeable batteries, solar microgrids, more efficient
tents, and better fixed shelters .76
4. Waste Disposal
If national defense is one of the largest causes of pollution in the
United States,77 one can only imagine the pollution imposed on other
nations during deployment abroad. A prominent feature of the Ameri-
can presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been the burn pit. A
burn pit is a large pit where waste is indiscriminately burned. Uncon-
trolled and unregulated until as recently as 2009, burning waste in
such pits has been the primary solid-waste management solution in
Afghanistan and Iraq from the beginning of the conflicts in 2001 and
2003.78 Although burn pits in Iraq were gradually phased out for the
most part by December 31, 2010, their use continues in Afghanistan,
where 197 burn pits were operating as of January 2011.79 Jet Propul-
sion 8 fuel, or JP-8, is used by the military to power aircraft, ground
73. Ali Sanders, Energy to Tactical Edge: Hybrid Power Saving Lives, WWW.ARMY.MIL
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.army.mil/article/75884/Energy-to-TacticalEdgeHybrid
power-saving_1ives.
74. Id.
75. Feller, supra note 65.
76. Kaften, supra note 57.
77. Kristen D. Wheeler, Note, Homeland Security and Environmental Regulation:
Balancing Long-Term Environmental Goals with Immediate Security Needs, 45 WASHBURN
L.J. 437, 438-39 (2006) (noting 80 percent of federal Superfund sites are controlled by the
Department of Defense (DOD); the Navy alone produces thirty-five million pounds of
hazardous wastes each year; in 1981, the military produced 92,000 metric tons of hazardous
waste).
78. COMM. ON THE LONG-TERM HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF EXPOSURE TO BURN PITS IN
IRAQ AND AFG., LONG-TERM HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF EXPOSURE TO BURN PITS IN IRAQ AND





vehicles, tent heaters, and cooking stoves; its ubiquitous use generally
makes it the fuel of choice for burn pits.80
In Iraq, burn pits were notoriously utilized at Joint Base Balad
and Camp Victory. Camp Victory operates as a complex, running eight
incinerators continuously, each consuming about 2,000 gallons of fuel
per day."' Its population consists of about 25,000 personnel who gener-
ate enormous quantities of garbage: pallets, packing materials, plastic
bottles, and food waste.82 In Afghanistan, there are 100,000 troops and
thousands more contractors, each producing 4.5 kilograms of waste per
day, according to the DOD.8 3 Bagram Air Base, in particular, has com-
plained of the hazardous effects of the burn pits on health and welfare
in the region. 84
These health impacts have been dubbed "Bagram lung" in Af-
ghanistan or "Iraqi crud" in Iraq.85 Whether the reported symptoms
derive from breathing in the dust, smoke, and particulate matter from
the burn pits has been subject to debate among experts. Waste prod-
ucts in burn pits include chemicals, paint, medical and human waste,
metal/aluminum cans, munitions and other unexploded ordnance, pe-
troleum and lubricant products, plastics and Styrofoam, rubber, wood,
and discarded food.86 Acknowledging the reality of "Bagram lung,"
however, has been elusive. Some experts claim that using JP-8 to
burn waste contaminates the air with toxic pollutants like lead, mer-
cury, and cadmium and causes respiratory illnesses, chronic allergies,
and cancers. 7 However, a 2011 Institute of Medicine report commis-
sioned by the Department of Veterans Affairs concluded that there was
limited or merely suggestive evidence of an association between expo-
sure to combustion products and reduced pulmonary functions. The
report further found inadequate or insufficient evidence of an associa-
80. COMM. ON THE LONG-TERM HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF ExPOSURE To BURN PITS IN
IRAQ AND AFG., supra note 78, at 48.
81. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9, at 20.
82. Id.
83. Frud Bezhan, U.S. Military Waste A Smoldering Afghan Health Issue, RADIO FREE
EuRoPE/RADio LIBERTY (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.rferl.org/content/us-military-waste-an_
afghan health issue/24374413.html.
84. Id.
85. COMM. ON THE LONG-TERM HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF EXPOSURE TO BURN PITS IN
IRAQ AND AFG., supra note 78, at ix.
86. Burn Pits, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.publichealth.va.gov/
exposures/burnpits/index.asp (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
87. Bezhan, supra note 83.
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tion between such exposure and cancer, respiratory disease, and other
diseases.88
However, a leaked memo from the Army dated April 15, 2011
supports a different conclusion.89 The high concentrations of dust and
burned waste present at Bagram Airfield are, rather, likely to impact
veterans' health for the rest of their lives: long term health risks in-
clude "reduced lung function or exacerbated chronic bronchitis, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, atherosclerosis, or
other cardiopulmonary diseases."90 While service members may not
necessarily acquire these conditions, the risk for acquiring them is
markedly increased.91
The presence of U.S. military bases abroad is rife with legal and
environmental issues. Until the last decade, a military base situated
in a foreign country would be subject to neither U.S. environmental
laws, nor the host state's laws. 9 2 The Military Environmental Respon-
sibility Act was introduced on June 13, 2001 to:
1) require full compliance from the DOD with federal and state en-
vironmental laws designed to protect public health and the
environment; 2) waive sovereign immunity and revoke any exemp-
tions from environmental laws granted to the DOD; and 3) signal to
the judicial branch that the DOD is to be given no special treatment
in regard to compliance with federal and state environmental
laws.93
Environmental degradation and pollution caused by a U.S.
presence can often necessitate a longer stay than initially expected:
first, because of the time needed to address environmental remediation
projects, and, second, because of the slow (re)building of support and
rapport with the local populace, who have suffered from the poor envi-
ronmental stewardship. 94 In the latter instance, the U.S. military can
literally burn its bridges with the local communities.
88. COMM. ON THE LONG-TERM HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF ExiPOsURE TO BURN PITS IN
IRAQ AND AFG., supra note 78, at 103.
89. Spencer Ackerman, Leaked Memo: Afghan 'Burn Pit' Could Wreck Troops' Hearts,
Lungs, WIRED.COM (May 22, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/05/bagram-




92. See Margaret M. Carlson, Environmental Diplomacy: Analyzing Why the U.S. Navy
Still Falls Short Overseas, 47 Naval L. Rev. 62 (2000).
93. Wheeler, supra note 77, at 443.
94. James A. Barkei, Green Warriors: Army Environmental Considerations for
Contingency Operations From Planning Through Post-Conflict, 2008-DEC ARmy LAW. 86
(Dec. 2008) (book review, David E. Mosher et al.).
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Even in the United States, the DOD has specific exemptions
from many federal environmental laws. In 2004, the DOD introduced
federal legislation proposing further exemptions from the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the
Clean Air Act (CAA), which was the last part of a legislative package
entitled the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative.9 5 The ratio-
nale was that DOD wanted to ensure military readiness and not be
hindered by environmental compliance requirements.96 While Con-
gress ultimately rejected most of the DOD's requested modifications,97
many exemptions remain.98 Moreover, the military remains exempt
even from some international environmental regulations. For in-
stance, the Montreal Protocol of 1987 called for the cessation of
production of CFCs before 2000; the Protocol is implemented by the
CAA, but allows for a limited exemption from phase-out for reasons of
"national security."99 In fact, during the Persian Gulf War, the Air
Force used halons to purge the fuel tanks of its fighter planes to pre-
vent them from exploding if hit by enemy ground fire.100 The Defense
Logistics Agency also has a reserve bank of ozone depleting chemicals
for "mission critical" future uses, although the Air Force Wright Labo-
ratory is attempting to identify adequate halon replacements.10 1
5. U.S. Energy Security
Although the fight for oil security seems to be taking place far
from our homes and livelihoods, increasing energy insecurity could
have very real and important domestic effects. As mentioned in Part I,
the Carter Doctrine has dominated congressional mindset and the for-
eign policy paradigm for several decades. The oil market has governed
U.S. relationships with Saudia Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.102 Other vul-
nerabilities are surfacing. In September 2012, it was revealed that
95. Caitlin Sislin, Comment, Exempting Department of Defense From Federal
Hazardous Waste Laws: Resource Contamination as "Range Preservation"?, 32 Ecology L.Q.
647, 649 (2005).
96. Id. at x. 659, 677.
97. Wheeler, supra note 77, at 456.
98. See Angela Cole Bonstead, EPA's Mixed Approach to Mixed Waste, 8 ENVTL. LAW.
521 (June 2002). See also Michael C. Gross, Note, Exempting Military Munitions from the
Federal Facility Compliance Act, Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir.
1998), 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 219 (2000).
99. Dycus, supra note 54, at 54.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9, at 5.
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more than four years' worth of financial records covering about $475
million worth of fuel purchases for the Afghan National Army may
have been shredded, which has raised questions of fraud. 03 Signifi-
cantly, there was no system in place for estimating the Army's future
fuel requirements, and Afghani officials were unable to supply records
for the current audit from March 2011 to March 2012.104
Climate change is increasingly recognized as a present and
pending national security issue that affects the U.S. military. In 2010,
the Pentagon included a climate section in its Quadrennial Defense Re-
view and the State Department addressed the issue in its Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review.105 In a recently-released report
commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelli-
gence agencies entitled "Climate and Social Stress: Implications for
Security Analysis,"1o6 the National Research Council, the nation's top
scientific research group, announced that climate change will place un-
paralleled strains on American military and intelligence agencies. 07
Clusters of seemingly unrelated but ever more disruptive events exac-
erbated by a warming climate will "create more frequent but
unpredictable crises in water supplies, food markets, energy supply
chains and public health systems" - much like Hurricane Sandy. 08
Such climate-driven crises could lead to internal instability as well as
international conflict, potentially forcing the United States to provide
humanitarian assistance or even military force to protect "vital energy,
economic or other interests." So-called "climate refugees" may provide
another source of instability as they migrate across international bor-
ders seeking safety and stability in the United States.109 The stresses
that energy security and climate change will impose on national secur-
ity will be different from any Americans have faced in the past. 0




105. John M. Broder, Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/sciencelearth/09climate.html?pagewanted=1&
emc=etal.
106. COMM. ON ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SOC. AND POLITICAL
STRESSES, CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS (John D.
Stembruner, Paul C. Stern & Jo L. Husbands eds., Nat'l Acads. Press 2012), available at
http://www.nap.edulopenbook.php?record-id=14682&page=1.
107. Broder, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Id.





A. The Green War Within
As noted in Part I, the Obama administration has laid a legal
framework to pave the way for greater investment and development of
clean, green, renewable energy technologies, fuels, and efficiency sys-
tems. U.S. forces have more than the desire to be "green" to get on
board with this program of action, since they are the ones faced with
the extreme costs, both in dollars and lives, of a petroleum-dependent
fighting force that would otherwise prefer to be mobile, independent,
and utterly efficient. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, one of the most out-
spoken defenders of clean military technology in Washington, does not
deny the more altruistic benefits of "going green," but ultimately seeks
a more practical and militaristic end profit: "To lower carbon emis-
sions, to lower greenhouse gas-that's a good thing to have happen.
[But w]e're doing this to become a better military, to make us better
war fighters. We're doing this as a matter of security.""1 The military
does not have an environmental agenda; its agenda is maintaining
America's military and economic leadership. 112
Despite this swell of support for renewable energy technology,
motivated by operational, domestic, and international security, the
movement is facing significant pushback from Congress. A green war
is being waged in Washington. Alternatively, a number of Republican
representatives in the House and Senate have called the Obama ad-
ministration's pursuit of greener energy a "war on carbon-based
energy"113 and a "war on affordable energy."114 Republican Congress-
man Randy Forbes has attacked Navy Secretary Ray Mabus' stance,
arguing for more supplies and fuel stocks, rather than expanding the
use of renewables.115
111. Standen, supra note 33.
112. Noah Shachtman, Republicans Order Navy to Quit Buying Biofiels, WIRED.COM
(May 14, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/05/republican-navy-biofuell
(Notably, fifteen other current and former national security officials have gone on record as
identifying climate change as a pressing and imminent threat to national and international
security.); see Fitzsimmons, supra note 1.
113. Standen, supra note 33.
114. Fitzsimmons, supra note 1 (quoting Republican Senator James Inhofe from
Oklahoma).
115. Ben Armbruster, Marine Corps Commandant Supports 'Great Green Fleet': 'I'm A
Big Believer In Alternative Energy', THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Sept. 5, 2012), http://
thinkprogress.org/security/2012/09/05/797231/amos-supports-great-green-fleet/?mobile=nc
("Shouldn't we refocus our priorities... instead of advancing a biofuels market? You're not
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These attitudes expressed themselves in a congressional battle
of bills. In May 2012, House Republicans had prohibited the DOD from
purchasing any alternative fuels that would cost more than "traditional
fossil fuel" by placing a measure in the NDAA.11 6 Biofuels would effec-
tively be priced out of contention; their comparatively small market
share means higher prices.117 The Senate followed suit, but a subcom-
mittee in the upper chamber reversed course and approved legislation
to continue funding for the Pentagon's use of biofuels.118 The Senate's
defense appropriations subcommittee passed biofuels funding that was
included in the defense spending bill for fiscal year 2013.119 Still,
James Bartis, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, re-
mains an avid opponent. "You can't make alternative fuels in the
battlefield," he says. "The military's big problem is not buying the fuel,
but getting it to frontline units."12 0 Bartis claims that transporting al-
ternative fuel to war zones would be just as fraught with danger as
conventional fuels; moreover, he wonders whether producers will make
these biofuels if "only the military" is showing interest.121
Ray Mabus, however, has already considered this proposition
and found it wanting. Rather, he believes that that the military can be
a leader:
the thing that the military can do is create a market for energy be-
cause the two potential obstacles for changing energy sources, one
is price, and two is infrastructure. And as the Navy buys more of
these alternative fuels, the price is going to come down because
you're creating a demand signal there. And second is, if that de-
mand is big enough, the private sector will build the infrastructure.
And once it's built for the military, it's [a] pretty logical and fairly
easy step for it to then be expanded into the civilian sector.122
It seems impossible to ignore or deny the linkages and partner-
ships between the military and civilian energy and technology sectors
that have produced many of the innovations that have changed daily





119. U.S. Senate Panel Approves Defense Bill With Biofuel Funds, REUTERS (July 31,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/usa-biofuels-defense-idUSL2E81VDS7201
20731.




122. Radio Interview with Steve Anderson & Ray Mabus, supra note 59.
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life as we know it: computers, cell phones, GPS, and the Internet.
There is no reason why such innovation should cease at the margins of
the energy market. The next two sections examine both aspects of
Mabus' energy leadership model: the first surveys the spectrum of mili-
tary renewable energy projects; the second highlights the potential of
military-private sector cooperation.
B. Greentech Goes Military
The technological disciplines in which the military is involved
can be divided into three main applications: power generation and en-
ergy efficiency at U.S. bases, 123 transportation, and soldier power. 124
Military installations, with their comprehensive networks of electrical
systems, require extensive building maintenance as they have grown
increasingly less efficient over time. 1 2 5 To address the costs of major
repair and replacement, Congress authorized the DOD to privatize the
military utility system. 126 The privatization "provides an opportunity
to combine related energy requirements into a single performance-
based contract," reducing economic and noneconomic inefficiencies. 12 7
In the past year, the DOD set a specific goal for the Army to have five
of its installations meet "net-zero" energy goals by 2020 and an addi-
tional 25 installations by 2030.128
Congress has also addressed new construction on military in-
stallations, requiring military departments to incorporate solar and
renewable energy systems into the design of new facilities.129 The DOD
implemented these two requirements through Defense Energy Policy
123. DoD energy conservation requirements are based primarily on two laws, the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 (NECPA) and the Energy Policy Act of
1992 (EPACT); Executive Orders impose upon federal agencies additional requirements to
conserve energy. See Christopher J. Aluotto, Privatizing and Combining Electricity and
Energy Conservation Requirements on Military Installations, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 723 (2001).
124. Kaften, supra note 28.
125. Aluotto, supra note 123, at 724.
126. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111
Stat. 1629 (codified in sections of 10 U.S.C.). In addition to ordering military departments
to comply, the DOD further required that departments must (1) purchase reliable electric
utility services, (2) reduce energy consumption, and (3) find ways to install renewable
technologies in buildings and facilities; Aluotto, supra note 123, at 724.
127. Aluotto, supra note 123, at 724.
128. DoD's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Initiatives, ENV'T & ENERGY STUDY
INsT. (July, 2011), http://files.eesi.org/dod-eere-factsheet_072711.pdf.
129. Aluotto, supra note 123, at 741. These statutes are: 10 U.S.C. § 2922(a) (2006) and
10 U.S.C. § 2915 (added as part of the Military Construction Codification Act, Pub. L. No.
97-214, 96 Stat. 153 (1982)).
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Memoranda (DEPPM).130 DEPPM 88-1 requires military departments
to evaluate, using its life-cycle costing procedure, 13 1 renewable forms of
energy when planning and constructing new facilities.132 It also autho-
rizes increased construction costs for renewable technology. 33
DEPPM 88-2 "encourages" military departments to contract with the
private sector for energy projects in existing facilities without estab-
lishing goals or mandates.134
Paradoxically or pragmatically, Congress has recently decided
that the DOD should not strive for the highest LEED135 building stan-
dards if the effort would cost domestic companies and taxpayers. 3 6
LEED certification is still possible, however, through a waiver that al-
lows the Defense secretary to proceed only if a project can be proven
cost effective and the project cost can be recovered in energy savings.13 7
Those military branches that have advocated compliance with LEED
building standards must now work harder to justify cost-effectiveness
beyond improved energy efficiency. 38 The government seems to be in-
130. Aluotto, supra note 123, at 741.
131. EPA defines lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions as "the aggregate quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant indirect emissions
such as significant emissions from land use changes) . . . related to the full fuel lifecycle,
including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from feedstock
generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery and use of the finished fuel to
the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to
account for their relative global warming potential." Clean Air Act § 211(o)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545 (West 2012).
132. Aluotto, supra note 123, at 741; Memorandum from John A. Mittino, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
Defense Energy Policy Memorandum 88-1, Defense Facilities Energy Selection (Oct. 14,
1988).
133. Id.
134. Memorandum from John A. Mittino, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Defense Energy Program Policy
Memorandum 88-2, Private Sector Financed Defense Energy Contracts (Sept. 30, 1988).
135. LEED is Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, a "voluntary,
consensus-based, market-driven program" that provides building owners and operators
with "a framework for identifying and implementing practical and measurable green
building design, construction, operations and maintenance solutions." LEED, U.S. GREEN
BLDG. COUNCIL, http://new.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
136. On December 31, 2011, President Obama signed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, enacting military construction appropriations law
H.R. 1540, which provides: "No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2012 may be obligated or
expended for achieving any LEED gold or platinum certification." National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 2830, 125 Stat. 1704 (2011).
137. LEED Sustainable Building Practices Go Global, supra note 22.
138. Id. One success story has been the Forces Command and the U.S. Army Reserve
Command headquarters on Fort Bragg, which received LEED Gold certification on
September 18, 2012. April Dudash, Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command
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vestigating LEED alternatives, 1 3 9 while the Army has already
developed its own construction code in lieu of LEED. 140 The military is
also keenly interested in creating "microgrids" for its bases.1 41
1. Waste-to-Energy
As discussed in Part II, waste is a significant byproduct of U.S.
military operations and can be cause for environmental and political
liability. The estimated cost of waste disposal in a Middle East operat-
ing environment ranges from $62 to $903 per ton.142 Yet waste
provides a unique opportunity for energy production, a genuine in-
stance where a man's trash becomes everyone's treasure.
Furthermore, converting waste to fuel can produce an estimated sav-
ings anywhere from $129 to $287 per soldier per month. 143 Although
the military has several specifications required for a waste-to-fuel pro-
cess to be useful to the military,144 many military programs have
already developed a number of experimental technologies that promise
to revolutionize the military's relationship with waste.
Headquarters on Fort Bragg Get LEED Gold Certification, FAYOBSERVER.COM (Sept. 18,
2012), http://fayobserver.com/articles/2012/09/18/1204766.
139. LEED Sustainable Building Practices Go Global, supra note 22; The DOD was
additionally required to submit a report to Congress analyzing the cost-effectiveness of
LEED certification standards and those set by the American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers. Id.
140. Philip Proefrock, US Army Abandoning LEED Certification, ECOGEEK.ORG (Mar.
27, 2012), http://www.ecogeek.orglarchitecture/3725-us-army-abandoning-leed-certification
(basing their system on the ASHRAE 189.1 standard for new buildings and renovations);
See Standard 189.1, ASHRAE.ORG, https://www.ashrae.org/resources-publications/
bookstore/standard-189-1 (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) ("Standard 189.1 provides a 'total
building sustainability package' for those who strive to design, build and operate green
buildings.").
141. Ucilia Wang, U.S. Military's Big Plan For Renewable Energy Projects, FORBES.COM
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/08/06/u-s-military-opens-up-
16m-acres-for-renewable-energy-projects ("Renewable energy will allow a military base to
maintain critical operations for weeks or months if an electric power grid goes down")
(quoting Dorothy Robyn, deputy under secretary of defense for installations and
environment).
142. Lisa Marie Powell, Speaker Abstract, Converting Army Waste to Fuel: Mobile
Integrated Sustainable Energy Recovery at the 13th North American Waste to Energy
Conference 6 (Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, May 23-25, 2005), available at http://www.seas.
columbia.edu/earth/wtert/sofos/nawtec/nawtecl3/nawtecl3-3145.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing specifications such as mobility, scalability, adequate rate of fuel
production, efficiency with regard to fuel produced per ton of waste, appropriate level of
quality of fuel produced, reliability of equipment, operator technical requirements, low
vulnerability during combat operations, no residual waste, capability to convert hazardous
waste).
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These innovative applications use a variety of methods to pro-
duce a synthetic gas (syngas) or alcohols, most of which contain more
than enough energy density to drive electric generators. 14 5 Some ap-
plications use pyrolysis of pre-dried solid waste; others use a
depolymerization of plastics and celluosics by using supercritical
water; some use a biomass to liquid fuel system; 146 and still others use
a combination of gasification and fermentation of waste to produce two
energy rich streams.147 Many of these new technologies are part of a
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program called
Mobile Integrated Sustainable Energy Recovery, or MISER. 148
145. LyoNs, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9 at 19.
146. Jerry B. Warner et al., Tactical Renewable Energy Production: Converting Waste
and Biomass to Energy and Fuel, 4 Advanced Materials, Mfg. & Testing Q. 3, 5 (2009),
available at http://ammtiac.alionscience.com/pdflAQV4N3.pdf. The Poplar Fuel Point, or
PFP, is a variant system based on the concept of distributed energy manufacturing using a
biomass feedstock that registers a number of co-benefits: biofuel is rendered from poplar
trees, a source that has the potential to reduce carbon dioxide (C02) emissions by 132 tons
per year, the ability to remove petroleum and explosive material contaminants from
groundwater and soil, and eliminates competition with food crops. Remarkably, this model
produces zero greenhouse gas emissions in the conversion process, which can produce, using
approximately 360 acres of poplar biomass, 120,000 gallons of low cost ethanol per year per
unit - enough to power 150 E-85 fleet vehicles annually. Id. at 20.
The Threat Biomass to Fuel, or TBF, system a contextualized model that promises to aid
other areas threatened by the ecological and environmental challenges posed by infected
and invasive trees. Western U.S. states, in particular, are battling twin scourges of bark
beetle infested trees and an invasive species of tamarisk trees. The TBF uses these trees as
biomass feedstock for bioethanol production. Id. at 6.
147. Id. at 3-5. Tactical Garbage to Energy Refiner, or TGER (pronounced "tiger") is a
unique system, completed in about 2006, that has been tested by the Army in Iraq. It
utilizes a hybridization of advanced fermentation and thermal decomposition processes to
convert about 2,000 pounds of waste per day to synthetic gas and ethanol, which are
blended to power a 60 kilowatt generator set. The process begins when the TGER separates
food and liquid wastes from dry solids, such as paper, plastic, cardboard, and polysterene
foam. The dry and liquid wastes undergo different sets of processes. The liquid and food
wastes are sent into a bioreactor, which uses enzymes and microorganisms in an advanced
fermentation process. That process is followed by distillation, where those wastes are then
digested and produce a fuel grade ethanol. The dry solids, however, are sent to a down-draft
gasifier where thermal decomposition produces syngas, or synthetic gas. Both the syngas
and the ethanol from the liquid waste process are aspirated into a diesel generator; the
mixture offsets about 90 percent of the diesel fuel typically needed to power the electric
generator. Tests have confirmed that the system is not only extremely efficient, but
produces nine times more energy than it consumes at about 50 kilowatts of electricity per
day.
Id. at 5. The Portable Waste to Energy Refinery, or POWER, is a semi-permanent, non-
tactical variant of TGER that serves to offset the direct and indirect costs associated with
landfills and utilities; its processes can provide auxiliary thermal utilities like building
heat, lot water, and absorptive air conditioning. Because of the types of wastes used and its
thermal capacities, they are intended for strategic placement between food service and
barracks areas.
148. LyoNs, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9 at 20; Powell, supra note 146.
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2. Transportation
Technological innovation in transportation systems is under-
way, largely concentrated in the Army and Navy branches: the Army's
focus has been on cutting-edge combat vehicle designs, while the Navy
has largely been focused on biofuels. In July 2012, the Navy debuted
the Great Green Fleet, 149 a five-ship demonstration aircraft carrier
strike group, the first of its kind to be powered by 50-50 biofuel blends:
mostly cooking oil and algae with petroleum-based marine diesel or
aviation fuel.o50 Whether the fleet will set sail again remains uncer-
tain: the cost of refitting or relying on biofuels thus far remains cost
prohibitive for the Navy:
More efficient turbine engines for the main battle tank have been
available for many years but the conversion cost to these or to im-
proved diesels is very high, high enough to have forestalled the
investment. Alternatives such as bio-based fuels may reduce the de-
mand for petroleum but will not reduce the logistics burden and
may not reduce the cost either. 51
Algae is increasingly being considered a viable fuel source.
Funds have been made available to convert algae into "jet propulsion
fuel 8," or JP-8, for Navy and Air Force aircraftl 52; the DOE awarded
$44 million in federal stimulus funds to the National Alliance for Ad-
vanced Biofuels and Bioproducts. 53 The DOE's Aquatic Species
Program collaborated with Arizona State University to research on al-
gal biofuel production: algae selection, photobioreactor innovation,
optimizing drying and oil extraction, conversion to biodiesel and jet
fuel, and life cycle assessment. 54 Cost still remains prohibitive, how-
ever; challenges remain in indentifying inexpensive drying methods
and fast-growing, high-oil content algae.155 DARPA is making head-
way in making algae biofuel cost competitive, reducing the cost of
extracting oil from algal ponds to $2 per gallon while ramping up mass
149. The Great Green Fleet was the subject, in large part, of the aforementioned
dialogue between Naval Secretary Ray Mabus and Congressman Randy Forbes.
150. Christina C. DiPasquale & Daniel J. Weiss, 'Great Green Fleet' Sails Toward
Pentagon Reduction In Oil Use, THiNKPROGRESS.ORG (July 10, 2012), http://thinkprogress.
org/climate/2012/07/10/513635/great-green-fleet-sails-toward-pentagons-reduction-in-oil-
use.
151. LyoNs, CHArT & VALDES, supra note 9 at 15-16.
152. Elizabeth Burleson & Winslow Burleson, Innovation Cooperation: Energy
Biosciences and Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 660-61 (2011).
153. Id. at 661.
154. Id. at 661.
155. Id.
2013 287
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 8:2:263
production of algae for jet fuel refining at a projected cost of $1 per
gallon. 156
On April 11, 2012, the Army opened the 30,000-square-foot
Ground Systems Power and Energy Lab (GSPEL), a research facility at
Detroit Arsenal expected to develop the next generation of combat ve-
hicles.157 GSPEL has already produced its counterpart to the Great
Green Fleet, the Green Warrior Convoy, a suite of vehicles that will be
launched in 2013 to test and demonstrate the Army's advanced vehicle
power and technology: fuel cells, hybrid systems, battery technologies
and alternative fuels.158 The Convoy will make stops at schools, com-
munity facilities, and military bases.15 9
3. Soldier Power
India Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment has be-
come a model for other battalions and branches, due to its ability to be
fully combat operational while remaining completely fuel independent.
The battalion, like many others in Afghanistan, had carried only
enough batteries to last three or four days at a time, at 20 to 35 pounds
for each soldier, and was dependent on frequent, dangerous resup-
plies.160 However, the patrol shed about 700 pounds between 35
soldiers by relying on two solar powered systems: GREENS, short for
"ground-renewable expeditionary energy systems," four portable mod-
ules that fold out into two large solar panels each, and SPACES, short
for "solar portable alternative communications energy systems," 64-
square-inch flexible solar panels that can be rolled up and packed.16 1
With greater mobility and a portable energy source, the battalion had
"stayed out for three weeks and didn't need a battery resupply once." 162
156. Id. at 660.
157. Kaften, supra note 57.
158. Id.
159. Id. The Army is also proposing the Advanced Vehicle and Power Initiative (AVPI), a
roadmap for advancing similar technological innovations in qualifying advanced propulsion
vehicles as those in the Green Warrior Convoy: battery electric vehicles (BEV), hybrid
electric vehicles (HEV), hybrid hydraulic vehicles (HHV), plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEV),
and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV). The plan would phase in these new vehicles over 20
years, reducing petroleum demand by 60 percent from the 2005 baseline while suggesting
that the excess electric power generated could be "exported" to local Army installations.
Fully realizing the AVPI, however, would require $4.6 in funding to offset the initial cost
premium of making the switch from conventional petroleum-based energy supply systems -
funding that may be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in the current congressional
climate. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9 at 16.





Moreover, two of India Company's forward patrol bases were powered
entirely by solar energy for the duration of the seven-month mission,
making it the only company that had sufficient energy the entire
time.163 India Company's solar energy reliance is a prime example of
how innovative renewable energy technology can maintain and even
enhance soldier power in the operational environment.
IV. GREEN MILITARY INITIATIVES/CROSS-SECTOR COOPERATION -
RECOMMENDATIONS
Clean technology military applications generally face the same
opportunities and hurdles as those in the civilian marketplace, such as
cost and reliability.164 Pike Research's recent report, "Renewable En-
ergy for Military Applications," indicates that technology cost
reductions and the leveraging of private sector financing "will enable
mature technologies such as photovoltaics, biomass, wind and geother-
mal power to be rapidly and cost-effectively deployed at scale during
the next 12 years."16 5 Contracting vehicles like power purchase agree-
ments, enhanced use leasing, utility energy savings contracts, and
energy savings performance contracts promise to accomplish such
rapid and affordable deployment at no additional cost to the
taxpayer. 6 6 Yet development programs and government-funded com-
petitions hint at that kind of cross-sector cooperation that could result
in military alternative energy technologies and cost-competitive fuels
transitioning to a commercial marketplace and vice versa. The defense
agencies are uniquely suited and motivated to spearhead such govern-
ment-public-private sector initiatives: they have the greater experience
and larger resources to make the long-range investments needed for
development. 6 7
Public-private partnerships (PPPs, or P3s) are defined by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) as "arrangements through
which the combined resources, risks, and rewards of a public agency
163. Id.
164. Kaften, supra note 28.
165. U.S. Department of Defense Spending on Renewable Energy Programs to Accelerate
Rapidly During the Next Decade, PIKERESEARCH.COM (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.
pikeresearch.com/newsroom/u-s-department-of-defense-spending-on-renewable-energy-
programs-to-accelerate-rapidly-during-the-next-decade.
166. Cheryl Kaften, U.S. Military Sets its Sights on Solar Sideline Fossil Fuels, PV Mag.
(Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beltraglus-military-sets-sights-
on-solar-to-sideline-fossil-fuels_100006426/#ix222hpg6TE:P.
167. See John S. Applegate, National Security and Environmental Protection: The Half-
Full Glass Stephen Dycus, National Defense and the Environment (University Press of New
England 1996), 26 Ecology L.Q. 350, 383 (1999) (book review).
2013 289
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 8:2:263
and a private company are intended to provide greater efficiency, bet-
ter access to capital, and improved compliance with a range of
government regulations."16 8 PPPs can more efficiently and economi-
cally deliver a needed project or service than would otherwise have
been provided by the government through traditional public sector
funding. 169 Since private and public entities can combine their exper-
tise and experience to finance these projects using all available
sources, the convoluted twists and turns of eligibility criteria for funds
and subsidies can be sufficiently reconciled and navigated, weaving to-
gether enough present and future money to accomplish the goals of the
public sector while still providing a profit incentive to private sector
participants.170 PPP projects provide a means of delivering public ser-
vices at a lower "up front" cost to the government. 171 Such agreements
have already been popular elsewhere in the world, but the United
States is catching on, with more than half of states enacting laws that
govern and promote the use of PPPS.172 For at least ten years, the
DOD has encouraged the use of such PPPs.173
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) can
and should take a prominent leadership role in these present and fu-
ture PPPs. DARPA has a unique history within the DOD. Created in
1958, its mission is to serve as the DOD's central research and develop-
ment (R&D) organization and "maintain U.S. technological superiority
168. DOD's Public-Private Partnerships Have Increased, But Need Clear Goals, GAO
Finds, 45 No. 16 GOVT CONTRACTOR J 73 (Apr. 23, 2003). Alternatively, the National
Council for Public-Private Partnerships (NCPPP) defines a PPP as a contractual agreement
between a public agency and a public sector entity through which the skills and assets of
each sector are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public;
each party shares in the potential risks and rewards in delivery of the service or facility.
Public-Private Partnerships Defined, How PPPs Work, ncppp.org, http://www.ncppp.org/
howpart/index.shtml#define (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). For a broader legal perspective on
PPPs, see also TRANSPORT POLICY AND TOURISM SECTION TRANSPORT AND TOURISM DIVISION,
UNITED NATIONs ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, available at http://www.unescap.org/ttdwl
ppp/trainingmaterials/PPPsLegalPerspective.pdf.
169. Stephen J. McBrady, Funding America's Infrastructure Needs: Public Private
Partnerships May Help Close Infrastructure Gap, CONSTR. BRIEFINGS No. 2009-3 (Mar.
2009).
170. Julia Paschal Davis, Public-Private Partnerships, 44-FALL PROCUREMENT LAw. 9,
9-10 (2008).
171. McBrady, supra note 169.
172. Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) Popular Globally, Gaining Stature in United
States, 36 CONSTR. CONTRACTS L. REP. 115 (Jul. 20, 2012).
173. DOD's Public-Private Partnerships Have Increased, But Need Clear Goals, GAO
Finds, supra note 168.
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over potential adversaries."174 To carry out its mission, it was given
unique authority to "enter into transactions (other than contracts, co-
operative agreements, and grants) . .. in carrying out basic, applied,
and advanced research projects."175 In 1993, DARPA received author-
ity to manage prototype projects "that are directly relevant to weapons
or weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed by the Depart-
ment of Defense."176 DARPA has been described as "an office that
doesn't function like the rest of the government," since its unconven-
tional government structure allows it to act quickly and decisively,
adapting to rapidly changing environments and taking advantage of
opportunities in technology. 177 Although the authority to acquire was
given to the DOD and its military departments in 1989, DARPA still
has the most experience in PPP regarding technology and weapons
development.
A number of cross sector PPP arrangements promise to develop
significant green technologies. Several fit the design-build-operate
(DBO) profile.' 7 8 The Army's Tank-Automotive Research, Develop-
ment and Engineering Center is funding a project partnering the Army
with two private companies, Diversified Energy and Velocys, to de-
velop a portable energy system that converts, coal, natural gas, and
biomass into diesel and jet fuel.179 The DOE's Advanced Research
Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) is funding a $30 million research
competition to improve the capability of storage devices like fuel cells
and batteries.o80 The hope is to engage America's best and brightest-
scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs-in the development of next-gen-
eration energy storage sensing and control technologies for war-
fighting equipment through ARPA-E's new Advanced Management
and Protection of Energy-storage Devices (AMPED) program.'18  An-
other example of such green military contracting is the collaboration
174. Nancy K. Sumption, Other Transactions: Meeting the Department of Defense's
Objectives, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 365, 380-81 (1999) (citing DoD Directive 5134.10 (Feb. 17,
1995)).
175. Sumption, supra note 174, at 383-84 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2371) (as amended; this
authority became permanent in 1991).
176. Id. at 383 (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-160, § 845, 107 Stat. 1547, 1721, 1722 (Nov. 30, 1993) (appearing as a note to 10
U.S.C. § 2371)).
177. Id. at 381.
178. Types of Public-Private Partnerships, NCPPP.ORG, http://www.ncppp.org/ppp-basics/
types-of-partnerships/ (last visited June 1, 2013).
179. Prachi Patel, Fuel From Waste, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Dec. 21, 2007), http//
www.technologyreview.com/news/409310/fuel-from-waste.
180. Kaften, supra note 57.
181. Id.
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between the National Automotive Center (NAC)18 2 and industry part-
ner, NextEnergy, to develop the Electronic Power Control and
Conditioning Module (EPCC).1sa The EPCC is a battlefield electronics
module that can, with the assistance of a Smart Load Interface Con-
troller (SLIC), manage power from varying types and grades of power
generation assets. The SLIC assisted EPCC accomplishes this by
cleaning and converting the power into a single, efficient, and consis-
tent 50- or 60-hertz alternate current (AC) output. 184
Potentially an example of a design-build-operate-maintain
(DBOM) collaboration,185 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a
Multiple-Award Task Order Contract (MATOC) Request for Proposal
(RFP) on August 7, 2012, for $7 billion in total contract capacity for
renewable energy purchases for a period of up to 30 years.186 Through
Power Purchase agreements, the Army will buy renewable and alter-
native energy generated by solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass
projects to be operated on or near U.S. military bases using private-
sector financing.18 7 October 5, 2012 was the deadline for proposal sub-
missions.18 8 Beyond the advantages that will flow to the military,
many clean technology entrepreneurs hope that "the cachet and the
enormous buying power of the military can transform their companies,
attract more investors, add jobs and change them from scrappy star-
tups into real players."189 These transformations can also spark a
much-needed transformation in the green energy market.
With or without congressional approval, military-private part-
nerships have the potential to shape, expand, and advance the clean
energy market. These partnerships have the potential for technological
innovations that will not just provide benefits to American soldiers and
182. National Automotive Center - NAC, TARDEC.ARMY.MIL, http://tardec.army.mill
Documents/AM2011-EE-Transfer%20ofo%2OPower.pdf.
183. LYONS, CHAIT & VALDES, supra note 9 at 17.
184. Id. Towards this end, while the EPCC is still undergoing testing, it is being
considered for its potential to transfer power from HEVs, wind turbines, solar panels, and
electric generators in the field to mobile hospitals and forward operating bases; perhaps,
ultimately creating wholly energy-independent bases. Id.
185. Types of Public-Private Partnerships, supra note 178.
186. Dennis K. Bohannon, Army Announces $7B Multiple Award Task Order Contract




188. Robert K. Tomkins, Government Contracts Law Alert: What is a "Small Business"
Under the Army's $7 Billion Renewable Energy RFP?, PATrON BOGGS LLP (Sept. 25, 2012
http://www.pattonboggs.com/Viewpoint/GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTS-LAW-ALERT-
What-is-a-Small-Business-Under-the-Armys-7-Billion-Renewable-Energy-RFP.
189. Standen, supra note 33.
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civilians, but also send positive ripple effects into the international en-
ergy marketplace. This in turn will enhance the global commitment to
reduce carbon emissions and sustainable development. Reaffirming
the numerous benefits that can be realized from linking DOD research
and development and the public and private sectors could assure the
evolution of small-scale clean technologies into cost-effective solutions
to energy crises, to be traded in a potentially global marketplace. A
shared transformative paradigm shift regarding energy is necessary
from across the executive, legislative, and military branches of
government.
CONCLUSION
As Admiral John Nathman, has said:
There are serious risks to doing nothing . . . We can pay now or
we're going to pay a whole lot later. The U.S. has a unique opportu-
nity to become energy independent, protect our national security
and boost our economy while reducing our carbon footprint. We've
been a model of success for the rest of the world in the past and now
we must lead the way ... 190
What is at stake are the long-term and global consequences to
the environment, the national economy, and international relations if
we continue to ignore the need for something approaching a sustaina-
ble military model of green warriors traveling in green convoys and
fleets. Economically and environmentally responsible energy policy
programs have critical and vital effects that transcend both pragmatic
military aims and lofty national aspirations.
An outdated energy policy has resulted in a mutually support-
ive regulatory synergy dependent on cheap, abundant, and reliable oil
and petroleum supplies; firms, regulators, and consumers alike have
not been incentivized to change their consumption practices.19 1 Con-
gressional resistance to renewable energy policies has been dismissed
by Siddhartha Velandy as mere "election-year posturing"192; however,
this characterization may not be accurate. Although Congress claims
to be, in part, resistant to greenlighting biofuel development and other
190. Fitzsimmons, supra note 1 (retired U.S. Navy Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces
Command under President George W. Bush).
191. Tomain, supra note 27, at 391.
192. Siddhartha M. Velandy, The Green Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and National Security, Nat'l Sec. J. 329 (Nov. 2, 2011),
available at http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/0lNol-3-Velandy-FINAL.pdf
See also id. at 364 ("Congress has already shown its willingness to initiate and pass energy
legislation in the national security context.").
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clean energy technologies because of the current economic environ-
ment, neither it, nor the U.S. generally, can afford to sacrifice today's
soldiers and tomorrow's security for low-cost business-as-usual prac-
tices now. Investing in greentech and biofuel growth now will only
serve to reduce spiraling costs later.
To begin to truly transform the U.S. energy market, the U.S.
government and public must assess the effects that subsidies have on
environmentally sound technologies. Representatives must further
demonstrate political leadership by raising public awareness so that
citizens can make informed decisions regarding competing energy
strategies.193 Such information is particularly important when the
public funding for the President Obama's 2012 clean energy proposal
will come from redirecting fossil fuel subsidies to clean energy
initiatives.194
The DOD and DOE195 have every reason to take a leadership
role in bringing to the fore the entirety of the costs associated with the
present petroleum-reliant energy system, including those hidden costs
associated with securing and transporting oil, and to push all actors
involved to internalize those energy security costs to the greatest ex-
tent possible to further spur greentech development. Such military
leadership should take into account an area of special concern hereto-
fore largely overlooked in relation to energy policy: the improvement of
the DOD's overseas environmental policies. 96 The DOD should coordi-
nate with EPA to create effective environmental policies that can be
built into military operational culture to ensure long-term environmen-
tal, national, and operational security. 97
David Mosher has suggested that because environmental law is
part of the core discipline of the Judge Advocate (JA) legal practice, 9 8
JAs have the ability to "directly impact the planning, application, and
potential resolution of environmental issues" 9 9 and to limit the mili-
tary's environmental liabilities by providing "fiscal advice to
193. Elizabeth Burleson, A Climate of Extremes: Transboundary Conflict Resolution, 32
VT. L. REV. 477, 487 (2008).
194. Tomain, supra note 27, at 402.
195. Professor Joseph Tomain argues that the DOE naturally would serve in a
leadership capacity. See Tomain, supra note 27, at 415-16 (suggesting that the DOE would
be the logical locus for energy innovation agencies).
196. See generally Margot Laporte, Note, Being All It Can Be: A Solution to Improve the
Department of Defense's Overseas Environmental Policy, 20 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 203
(2010).
197. Wheeler, supra note 77, at 464-65.
198. Barkei, supra note 94, at 87.
199. Id. at 88.
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commanders, influencing the operational priorities of expenditures,
and forecasting liabilities."2 0 0 Mosher advocates for JAs to solicit civil-
ian counsel to familiarize themselves with environmental issues to
develop the knowledge base sufficient to be applied during opera-
tions, 20 1 giving JAs a key role in environmental contingency planning,
execution, risk alleviation, and issue resolution.2 0 2 Beyond the JA role,
however, the DOD, as advocated by Margaret Carlson, should also im-
prove its environmental diplomacy by offering host nations the
freedom to apply U.S. environmental standards to DOD overseas in-
stallation activities. If the host-nation declines, the installation will
then apply the host nation's environmental standards.203 Moreover,
with some creative reimagining, a way to accomplish all of these ideals
at once despite seemingly inevitable operations costs and burdens is to
enhance and expand on the sustainable, mobile, and independent
waste-to-energy models addressed in this Article.
PPPs have been and will continue to grow more beneficial in
turning costly environmental and political liabilities into sources of en-
ergy, cost reduction, and improved health and welfare. Coordination
between the private and government sectors to form mutually benefi-
cial relationships to push green energy development will further
increase the cost-competitiveness of these technologies. The military,
as the largest consumer of energy, can serve as an invaluable testing
ground, providing a wide range of scenarios and environments in
which to thoroughly test the hardiness and breadth of new technology.
The DOD's collaboration with the private sector can also be a way to
bring in a form of public participation via public-private research and
development. 204 The domestic clean energy market is estimated to
support close to 750,000 jobs and potentially $40 billion in clean energy
exports by 2020.205 Rather than shrinking at the cost of green energy
development, Congress ought to embrace PPPs and their potential to
reap the rewards of an expanding market.
PPPs and their technological progeny will not only benefit the
military, but also promise to significantly benefit civilian life-espe-
cially those with the greatest cross-sector potential. For instance, the
waste-to-energy systems can be used in universities, hospitals, govern-
ment complexes, and other high-use, large-capacity institutions to
200. Id. at 90.
201. Id. at 91.
202. Id. at 86.
203. Carlson, supra note 92, at 111.
204. Applegate, supra, note 167, at 389-94.
205. Tomain, supra note 27, at 427.
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reduce their carbon footprint and conserve energy. Other projects, like
the Green Warrior Convoy, which is already slated to visit schools, can
be utilized as part of climate and energy education outreach programs.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) encourages member states to establish education and
training programs to facilitate public awareness of climate change. 206
The most optimistic of outlooks envision a push for leadership
producing a "Green Arms Race," giving the U.S. greater credibility and
a stronger role in the international climate change dialogue and bene-
fiting the global energy market.207 What is ultimately and urgently
needed now, however, is a united national energy policy that holisti-
cally addresses military contributions to GHG emissions and accounts
for the hidden costs of reliance on conventional fossil fuels. Cleaner,
greener foreign and domestic policies will address energy security and
independence, renewable energy development, and seek opportunities
for growth and innovation amid economic restraint and regulation.
Rather than retaining the dubious title of reigning leader in energy
consumption, the DOD has a prime opportunity to reinvent itself as a
national, and even global, leader in green energy innovation.
206. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Article 10(e), Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998)
("Cooperate in and promote ... the development and implementation of education and
training programmes. . .in particular human and institutional capacities and the exchange
or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field.. .and facilitate at the national level
public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change."); Subsidiary Body
for Implementation 37, COP 18/ CMP 8, Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26-Dec. 1, 2012, Doha Work
Programme on Article 6 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.47, Annex (2012)
(promoting formal and non-formal education and training programmes focused on climate
change; conducting training programmes; and designing and implementing public
awareness programmes on climate change and its effects).
207. See Velandy, supra note 192, at 351-52.
296
